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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case is before this court on an appeal by Shell Oil 
Co. ("Shell") from an order of the district court which 
sustained an order of the Department of the Interior 
Minerals Management Service ("MMS") requiring Shell to 
produce certain documents. The district court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. This appeal turns on 
issues of statutory and regulatory interpretation. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Congress has empowered the Department of the Interior 
to enter into and administer leases to develop oil and gas 
 




resources on federal lands. Congress enacted the Federal 
Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act ("FOGRMA") in 1983, 
to strengthen the ability of the Secretary of the Interior 
("Secretary") to collect oil and gas royalties by developing a 
comprehensive system of royalty management in order 
properly to collect and account for all royalties. 30 U.S.C. 
SS 1701 et seq. FOGRMA authorizes the Secretary to "audit 
and reconcile, to the extent practicable, all current and 
past lease accounts for leases of oil and gas and take 
appropriate actions to make additional collection or refunds 
as warranted." Section 101(c)(1), 30 U.S.C. S 1711(c)(1). 
Section 103(a) of FOGRMA, 30 U.S.C. S 1713(a), deals with 
maintenance of information and production of records: 
 
       A lessee, operator, or other person directly involved in 
       developing, producing, transporting, purchasing, or 
       selling oil or gas subject to this chapter through the 
       point of first sale or the point of royalty computation, 
       whichever is later, shall establish and maintain any 
       records, make any reports, and provide any 
       information that the Secretary may, by rule, reasonably 
       require for the purposes of implementing this chapter 
       or determining compliance with rules or orders under 
       this chapter. Upon the request of any officer or 
       employee duly designated by the Secretary or any State 
       or Indian tribe conducting an audit or investigation 
       pursuant to this act, the appropriate records, reports, 
       or information which may be required by this section 
       shall be made available for inspection and duplication 
       by such officer or employee, State, or Indian tribe. 
 
Section 3(12) of FOGRMA defines "person" as "any 
individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership 
consortium, or joint venture." 30 U.S.C. S 1702(12). Thus, 
Shell as a corporation can be a person within section 103(a) 
and its implementing regulations. 
 
The Secretary has delegated royalty enforcement 
responsibilities to the Director of the MMS. MMS 
regulations require "each lessee, operator, revenue payor or 
other person [to] make and retain accurate and complete 
records necessary to demonstrate that payments of rentals, 
royalties . . . and other payments . . . are in compliance 
with lease terms, regulations, and orders." 30 C.F.R. 
 




S 212.51(a). The "lessee, operator, revenue payor, or other 
person required to keep records" must maintain them for 
six years and make them available for inspection. 30 C.F.R. 
S 212.51(b)-(c). 
 
Shell Western E & P, Inc. ("Shell Ex") is primarily a 
producer of oil and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Shell, 
which primarily markets oil. App. at 175, 181. Shell Ex 
produces oil from land within 32 federal leases in California 
issued under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. 
S 181, and pays royalties to the federal government on the 
oil produced.1 App. at 181. Shell Ex sells much of this oil 
to Shell pursuant to an agreement dated January 1, 1985, 
under which Shell pays its posted prices for that 
geographical area or uses third-party price postings, as was 
done here because Shell does not post prices for California. 
App. at 175-76, 290. 
 
The Secretary can delegate audit authority for federal 
leases to the state in which they are located. 30 U.S.C. 
S 1735(a). Pursuant to this delegation of authority, the 
California State Controller's Office ("State") reviewed Shell 
Ex's onshore leases in California for the period from 
January 1, 1985, to December 31, 1988. The State 
requested that Shell provide records relating to its 
disposition of federally derived oil purchased from Shell Ex, 
but Shell declined to comply with this request on the basis 
that the transactions between Shell Ex and Shell 
constituted the point of royalty computation. App. at 181- 
82. 
 
On April 3, 1990, the Denver office of the Royalty 
Compliance Division of MMS ordered Shell to turn over the 
documents requested by the State, which included all 
documents regarding the disposition of federally derived oil, 
the sales contracts and verification of all revenue from sales 
of this oil to third parties, and a detailed schematic showing 
the pipeline system used to transport this oil. App. at 168- 
69. MMS stated in the order that data regarding Shell's 
arm's-length sales of the oil were necessary to determine 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For onshore leases like the ones at issue here, the state in which the 
leases are located receives 50% of the royalties. 30 U.S.C. S 191. 
 




whether the non-arm's length price Shell paid Shell Ex was 
acceptable for royalty valuation purposes. 
 
Shell appealed this order to the Director of MMS, who 
sustained the order of the Denver office. The Director ruled 
that the gross proceeds rule2 required that Shell be 
considered the "lessee" whenever it resold oil purchased 
from Shell Ex, and thus the requested documents were 
necessary to determine the proper royalty valuation. App. at 
183-84. 
 
Shell then appealed from the Director's decision to the 
Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA") which originally 
ruled in its favor. Shell Oil Co., 130 IBLA 93 (1994). In its 
opinion the IBLA ruled that under the March 1, 1988 
revisions to the MMS regulations, Shell's proceeds are only 
relevant if Shell is a "marketing affiliate" for Shell Ex. See 
30 C.F.R. S 206.102(b)(1)(i) (when oil sold to marketing 
affiliate, lessee's "gross proceeds" is value obtained by 
marketing affiliate in arm's-length sale of oil). The IBLA 
found that Shell was not a marketing affiliate of Shell Ex, 
as defined in 30 C.F.R. S 206.101, and thus information 
relating to Shell's proceeds was not relevant. 130 IBLA at 
96-97. 
 
The IBLA reversed itself after MMS petitioned for 
reconsideration. Shell Oil Co. (On reconsideration), 132 IBLA 
354 (1995). The IBLA ruled that the marketing affiliate 
issue was irrelevant to whether the gross proceeds rule 
applied and information regarding Shell's proceeds from the 
oil was necessary to determine the value of production. Id. 
at 356-58. The IBLA later denied Shell's petition to 
reconsider this decision. 
 
Shell then filed this suit in the district court in Delaware 
seeking a declaration that MMS could not order it to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This rule was amended on March 1, 1988, and now states that "under 
no circumstances shall the value of production, for royalty purposes, be 
less than the gross proceeds accruing to the lessee for lease production, 
less applicable allowances determined pursuant to the subpart." 30 
C.F.R. S 206.102(h). Previously, the rule stated that "[u]nder no 
circumstances shall the value of production . . . be deemed to be less 
than the gross proceeds accruing to the lessee from the sale thereof 
. . . ." 30 C.F.R. S 206.103 (1987). 
 




produce the documents in question. Thus, Shell requested 
an order vacating the MMS's order. The Secretary of the 
Interior unsuccessfully sought to have the suit dismissed or 
transferred on venue grounds. Shell Oil Co. v. Babbitt, 920 
F. Supp. 559 (D. Del. 1996). The government then filed a 
counterclaim seeking enforcement of the MMS order. After 
both parties moved for summary judgment, the court ruled 
in favor of the government and upheld the IBLA's decision 
on November 14, 1996. Shell Oil Co. v. Babbitt, 945 F. 
Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1996). The district court held that 
FOGRMA section 103(a), 30 U.S.C. S 1713(a), defined only 
the class of persons from which the Secretary can obtain 
documents and did not limit, as Shell argued, the type of 
documents to be maintained. The court also found that 
Shell was covered by 30 C.F.R. S 212.51 as an"other 
person" despite the fact that Shell did not have paying or 
operating responsibility on the lease. 
 
Shell then filed a timely notice of appeal. Shell now 
argues that neither section 103(a) of FOGRMA nor 30 
C.F.R. S 212.51 gives the Secretary authority to seek 
documents relating to events after the first sale of oil from 
a federal lessee, regardless of whether the sale is to an 
affiliated company. We review the district court's 
interpretation of both statutes and regulations on a de novo 
basis. United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 
1994); Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 
949 F.2d 1274, 1279 (3d Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, if 
Congress has not spoken directly to the question in issue, 
we will defer to a reasonable construction of a statute by 
the agency which administers it. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842- 
43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82 (1984). Moreover, we will 
uphold an agency's interpretation of its own regulations 
"unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation." Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 
504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 2386 (1994).3  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. A challenge to the validity of a subpoena for similar documents 
covering 1989-96 is pending in United States v. Shell Oil Co., Misc. No. 
31372 (C.D. Cal.). Shell also is challenging an MMS order to pay 
additional royalties for a portion of the time period at issue here. Shell 
Oil Co. v. Babbitt, No. 96-CV-1078-H (N.D. Okla.). 
 






A. Section 103(a) of FOGRMA 
 
Shell argues that section 103(a) does not give the 
Secretary the authority to seek the requested documents 
relating to Shell's disposition of the oil it bought from Shell 
Ex. It contends that the Secretary and the district court 
erred in determining that the underlined portion of section 
103(a) -- "A lessee, operator, or other person directly 
involved in developing, producing, transporting, 
purchasing, or selling oil or gas subject to this chapter 
through the point of first sale or the point of royalty 
computation, whichever is later, shall establish and 
maintain any records . . ." 30 U.S.C. S 1713(a) (emphasis 
added) -- limited only the class of persons from whom the 
Secretary could request documents and did not limit the 
type of document involved. Shell contends that the phrase 
"through the point of first sale or the point of royalty 
computation" limits the type of documents, not the type of 
person. 
 
In a case almost directly on point, the Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit ruled that MMS has the authority to 
request exactly the type of documents at issue here, 
records of subsequent sales by a company which 
purchased oil from an affiliated federal lessee.4 Santa Fe 
Energy Prods. Co. v. McCutcheon, 90 F.3d 409 (10th Cir. 
1996). While the Santa Fe court did not specifically address 
the argument Shell raises here, it ruled that section 103(a) 
covers the first purchaser of oil produced under a federal 
lease because such a purchaser is a " `person directly 
involved in . . . purchasing . . . oil or gas subject to this 
chapter through the point of first sale or royalty 
computation.' " Id. at 414 (quoting 30 U.S.C. S 1713(a)). 
 
The Secretary urges precisely this interpretation of 
FOGRMA here. We agree with both the Secretary and the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Further, wefind 
that this interpretation is the most natural reading of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Shell does not distinguish this case except to note that the court did 
not discuss the legislative history of FOGRMA. Br. at 32 n.20. 
 




statute,5 and thus the intent of Congress is clear without 
resort to the legislative history. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82. We therefore do not 
comment on Shell's exhaustive discussion of the legislative 
history of FOGRMA except to say that we do not find 
sufficient remarks dealing with the narrow issue in this 
case to support its position. Id. at 862, 104 S.Ct. at 2791. 
Since the legislative history does not compel a different 
result, we must find the plain language of the statute 
dispositive. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056 (1980). 
 
B. Implementing Regulation 
 
Shell also argues that the implementing regulation for 
section 103 of FOGRMA, 30 C.F.R. S 212.51, does not apply 
in this case. Section 212.51(a) provides: 
 
       Each lessee, operator, revenue payor, or other person 
       shall make and retain accurate and complete records 
       necessary to demonstrate that payments of rentals, 
       royalties, net profit shares, and other payments related 
       to offshore and onshore Federal and Indian oil and gas 
       leases are in compliance with lease terms, regulations, 
       and orders. Records covered by this section include 
       those specified by lease terms, notices and orders, and 
       by the various parts of this chapter. Records also 
       include computer programs, automated files, and 
       supporting systems documentation used to produce 
       automated reports or magnetic tape submitted to the 
       Minerals Management Service (MMS) for use in its 
       Auditing and Financial System (AFS) and Production 
       Accounting and Auditing System (PAAS). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We do not find the "acute redundancy" which Shell argues this 
reading of the statute creates. Br. at 25. The phrase "directly involved" 
in section 103(a) of FOGRMA modifies a number of activities in addition 
to purchasing oil (developing, transporting, selling). Shell's argument 
that the parties involved in the first sale of oil necessarily are 
directly 
involved in purchasing oil is true, but someone directly involved in 
transporting oil is not, and the phrase "through the point of first sale" 
is 
therefore necessary to limit the class of people required to maintain 
records. Without the limitation, section 103(a) could apply far 
downstream. 
 




Shell argues that only those documents specified in the 
latter two sentences of section 212.51(a) can be requested. 
The Secretary contends that the regulation creates a duty 
to maintain all documents "necessary to demonstrate" that 
the lessee is complying with royalty requirements and that 
the second and third sentences are illustrations rather than 
an exhaustive list. The Secretary contends that the 
language of the regulation neither states nor implies that 
the examples listed are complete. It merely says that 
required records "include" those listed. See 30 C.F.R. 
S 212.51(a). 
 
Shell argues that the Secretary's "original intent" in 
drafting the regulation supports its view. Shell's main 
support for this "intent" argument is that the preamble 
does not explicitly deny the reading Shell urges. We, 
however, do not find that the preamble resolves the issue. 
Shell also argues that the Secretary's statements to the 
Office of Management and Budget under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act ("PRA"), 44 U.S.C. SS 3501 et seq., do not 
support the Secretary's current interpretation of the 
regulation. Shell does not mention that the PRA does not 
apply to the collection of information during FOGRMA 
audits. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan, 963 F.2d 1380, 
1387 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing 44 U.S.C. S 3518(c)(1)(B) 
PRA exemption for administrative investigations). 
 
Shell also argues that it is not covered under the 
regulation because the last sentence of section 212.51(b) 
states: "Lessees, operators, revenue payors, or other 
persons shall maintain the records generated during the 
period for which they have paying or operating 
responsibility on the lease for a period of 6 years." Shell 
argues that this 6-year limit only applies to "lessees, 
operators, revenue payors, or other persons" who have 
"paying or operating responsibility on the lease" and since 
Shell does not have such responsibility the limit does not 
apply to it. Thus, according to Shell, either Shell has to 
keep records forever, or it does not have a duty to keep 
records at all. In other words, in its view Shell is not an 
"other person" under section 212.51(a). Since FOGRMA 
itself also imposes a 6-year record-keeping limitation 
period, 30 U.S.C. S 1713(b), Shell contends that section 
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 212.51 also applies only to persons having paying or 
operating responsibility. 
 
While this is an intricately constructed argument, it 
ultimately collapses under its own weight. We acknowledge 
that there is some ambiguity in section 212.51(b), but Shell 
proposes that we resolve that ambiguity by distorting 
section 212.51(a). The plain language of section 212.51(a) 
makes clear that it applies to "other persons" in addition to 
operators and payors, and it does not make sense to read 
other persons as "other persons with paying or operating 
responsibility." 
 
Shell has failed to demonstrate that the agency's 
interpretation of section 212.51 is "plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation." Thomas Jefferson Univ., 
512 U.S. at 512, 114 S.Ct. at 2386. We therefore must give 
the interpretation "controlling weight," id., and affirm the 
district court's ruling that section 212.51 applies to Shell 
and MMS has authority to order the production of the 
documents at issue. 
 
C. 1988 Regulatory Amendments 
 
We address one final issue. On March 1, 1988, amended 
royalty valuation regulations became effective. These 
regulations apply only to oil produced after their effective 
date, see Santa Fe, 90 F.3d at 413, which is only the last 
ten months of the period at issue here. For the bulk of the 
period in this case, Santa Fe is applicable, and we follow it 
and hold that the Secretary clearly has authority to seek 
the requested documents. For the last ten months, 
however, we must consider the effect of the new 
regulations, an issue Sante Fe did not address explicitly. 
 
Under 30 C.F.R. S 206.102(b)(1)(i), when oil is sold or 
transferred by a federal lessee to its marketing affiliate, 
which then resells it, the value of the oil for royalty 
purposes is the value the marketing affiliate receives from 
an arm's-length purchaser. Shell, however, is not a 
marketing affiliate of Shell Ex because it does not acquire 
and market oil only from Shell Ex. See 30 C.F.R. S 206.101. 
Non-arm's-length transactions, other than with marketing 
affiliates, are covered by 30 C.F.R. S 206.102(c), which lists 
 




several different methods of royalty computation. The IBLA 
originally found that the third-party posted prices used in 
the sales from Shell Ex to Shell met the requirements of 30 
C.F.R. S 206.102(c)(2). Given this holding, MMS did not 
need the documents requested because the gross proceeds 
rule is only applicable to an affiliate when it is a marketing 
affiliate, thus distinguishing Santa Fe. 130 IBLA at 97. On 
reconsideration, however, the IBLA determined that the 
marketing affiliate distinction was not relevant to this case 
because the gross proceeds rule, 30 C.F.R. S 206.102(h), 
supersedes all other royalty calculation methods. 132 IBLA 
at 355-56. 
 
It is undisputed that Shell paid Shell Ex a "market price" 
for the federally derived oil it purchased. The gross 
proceeds rule requires that the federal royalties be based, 
at a minimum, on what the lessee receives for the oil, not 
the "market price" of the oil. If Shell Ex sold the oil at a 
premium above the market price, federal royalties would be 
based on that premium price. Shell appears to be arguing 
that it can avoid this result by purchasing the oil from 
Shell Ex at the market price and then reselling it at a 
premium itself. MMS is entitled to documents which will 
allow it to determine if Shell Ex is undervaluing oil for 
royalty purposes by first transferring it to Shell. Whether or 
not that is so we are satisfied that for auditing purposes 




We conclude by emphasizing that our ruling is narrow. 
We do not find that MMS can impute the proceeds received 
by Shell to Shell Ex. We will leave the determination of that 
issue to a case in which it is presented. Thus, we agree 
with Shell that this appeal "does not directly concern the 
proper value of royalties on oil produced from [Shell Ex's] 
32 leases." Br. at 7. Consequently, we hold only that given 
an administrative agency's broad investigative authority, 
see United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43, 
70 S.Ct. 357, 364 (1950), and the statutory and regulatory 
scheme we have described, MMS is authorized to order the 
production of documents relating to Shell's arm's-length 
sales of the oil it purchased from Shell Ex in non-arm's- 
 




length transactions. In the circumstances, we will affirm 
the order of the district court entered November 11, 1996. 
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